Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.002zbMath1099.91040OpenAlexW2086874637MaRDI QIDQ2485493

John W. Patty

Publication date: 5 August 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

candidate motivationsexpected vote share

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

The political economy of (de)centralization with complementary public goods ⋮ A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters ⋮ A theory of voting in large elections ⋮ Political competition between differentiated candidates ⋮ Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model ⋮ The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models ⋮ Vote-motivated candidates ⋮ Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty

Cites Work

• A theory of voting in large elections
• Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
• Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting
• Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Local Nash equilibrium in multiparty politics
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters
• Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
• Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates