Revisiting matrix games: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2005.11.006zbMath1109.92034OpenAlexW2074586871WikidataQ51955485 ScholiaQ51955485MaRDI QIDQ2500392

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 23 August 2006

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2005.11.006

zbMATH Keywords

ESSReplicator dynamicsNISConvergence stableMatrix(G)-ESS

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (9)

Cooperation in defence against a predator ⋮ Evolutionary matrix games and optimization theory ⋮ Evolutionary substitution and replacement in \(N\)-species Lotka-Volterra systems ⋮ ESS, NIS and GIS for matrix games in n-species systems ⋮ Evolutionarily stable strategy and invader strategy in matrix games ⋮ The replicator equation and other game dynamics ⋮ Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information ⋮ The ESS for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints and its relationship with the asymptotically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics ⋮ ESS, NIS and GIS for multi-player matrix game in single population

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