Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences

DOI10.1007/s003550100114zbMath1072.91525OpenAlexW2067992680MaRDI QIDQ2567916

Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 14 October 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100114

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Search theory (90B40) Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (11)

Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation ⋮ On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible ⋮ Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences ⋮ Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences ⋮ Single-basined choice ⋮ Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

This page was built for publication: Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences