On the foundations of competitive search equilibrium with and without market makers

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105605OpenAlexW4313561784MaRDI QIDQ2685858

Pieter A. Gautier, Susan Vroman, Xiaoming Cai, James W. Albrecht

Publication date: 23 February 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105605

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencycompetitive searchmarket makerssimultaneous search

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Search theory (90B40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Directed search with multiple job applications
• Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power
• Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications
• Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• ON THE GAME‐THEORETIC FOUNDATIONS OF COMPETITIVE SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*
• Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search.

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