A NOTE ON BAGWELL'S PARADOX AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN THREE CLASSIC GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198911002873zbMath1247.91039MaRDI QIDQ2907967

José Luis Ferreira

Publication date: 4 September 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

noiseoutside optionbattle of the sexesforward inductionBagwell's paradoxBeer-Quiche game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games
• Commitment and observability in games
• On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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