Resource Allocation for Homeland Defense: Dealing with the Team Effect

DOI10.1287/deca.1120.0242zbMath1355.91050OpenAlexW2156340053MaRDI QIDQ2963446

Andrew Samuel, Seth D. Guikema

Publication date: 14 February 2017

Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.1120.0242

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryrisk assessmenthomeland securityagency theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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