Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3117707
DOI10.1287/mnsc.1070.0806zbMath1232.91296OpenAlexW2060469632MaRDI QIDQ3117707
Elena Katok, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Publication date: 29 February 2012
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/603f6f8a2d97394cae68d05e65f050c6d8a46b2b
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items
Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Regret in auctions: theory and evidence ⋮ ON VARIABILITY OF SERIES AND PARALLEL SYSTEMS WITH HETEROGENEOUS COMPONENTS ⋮ Does regret matter in first-price auctions? ⋮ Inventory control and pricing for regret-averse newsvendor ⋮ Regret theory: a new foundation ⋮ Dual sourcing with price discovery ⋮ Fear of losing in a clock auction ⋮ Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information ⋮ An equilibrium model of the supply chain network under multi-attribute behaviors analysis ⋮ Value-rationalizability in auction bidding ⋮ Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback ⋮ Dynamic Purchase Decisions Under Regret: Price and Availability ⋮ The impacts of retailers' regret aversion on a random multi-period supply chain network
