ERRATUM: "BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION"

DOI10.1142/S0219198907001497zbMath1140.91455OpenAlexW1963493140MaRDI QIDQ3502828

Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

Publication date: 20 May 2008

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198907001497

zbMATH Keywords

bankruptcy problemsmanipulation by mergingmanipulation by splittingTAL-family

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items

BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION ⋮ A sequential partition method for non-cooperative games of bankruptcy problems ⋮ Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems ⋮ Progressive and merging-proof taxation ⋮ Some game theoretic marketing attribution models ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

Cites Work

• The TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems
• Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations
• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
• Distributive justice in taxation
• The proportional solution for rights problems
• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems
• Inequality reducing properties of composite taxation
• A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims
• On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk