On the Price of Stability for Designing Undirected Networks with Fair Cost Allocations
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Publication:3613794
DOI10.1007/11786986_53zbMath1223.91014OpenAlexW1558409237MaRDI QIDQ3613794
Haim Kaplan, Meital Levy, Svetlana Olonetsky, Ronen Shabo, Amos Fiat
Publication date: 12 March 2009
Published in: Automata, Languages and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/11786986_53
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