Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation

DOI10.1287/mnsc.28.6.604zbMath0482.90037OpenAlexW1974669536MaRDI QIDQ3941166

Artur Raviv, Milton Harris, Charles H. Kriebel

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.28.6.604

zbMATH Keywords

transfer pricingasymmetric informationtheory of the firmincentivesorganization designoptimal resource allocationintrafirm resource allocationdivision managers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production models (90B30) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items

Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted ⋮ Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management ⋮ Goal congruence analysis in multi-division organizations with shared resources based on data envelopment analysis ⋮ How should the cost of joint risk capital be allocated for performance measurement? ⋮ Optimal repair of degrading computers under asymmetric information and incentive incompati\-bility. ⋮ Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents ⋮ Efficiency and equity in dynamic principal-agent problems ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules ⋮ Allocation of risk capital on an internal market ⋮ Supplier credits, limited liquidity, and timely demand information ⋮ Internal financing, managerial compensation and multiple tasks ⋮ Optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility ⋮ Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information ⋮ Information and incentives in computing services supply: The effect of limited system choices ⋮ Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents

This page was built for publication: Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation