The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G(N, W) in a Public Goods Economy

DOI10.2307/1913951zbMath0367.90046OpenAlexW2031589562MaRDI QIDQ4145378

Mamoru Kaneko

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913951

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (11)

A friendly computable characteristic function ⋮ Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach ⋮ The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities ⋮ Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies ⋮ The \(\gamma \)-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints ⋮ Share equilibrium in local public good economies ⋮ Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game ⋮ Proportional income taxes and cores in a public goods economy ⋮ THE CORE COINCIDES WITH THE NUCLEOLUS ALLOCATIONS IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY WITH TAXATION ⋮ Balanced environmental games ⋮ Ratio equilibrium in an economy with externalities

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