Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability

DOI10.3982/TE1910zbMath1395.91152OpenAlexW2225080339MaRDI QIDQ4586044

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1910

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessanonymitygeneralized median voting schemes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (9)

On the implementation of the median ⋮ Criteria to compare mechanisms that partially satisfy a property: an axiomatic study ⋮ On single-peaked domains and min-max rules ⋮ Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents ⋮ Manipulability in school choice ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ Strategy-proof location of public facilities ⋮ Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable ⋮ On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals

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