Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments

DOI10.3982/TE898zbMath1395.91299MaRDI QIDQ4586113

Paul J. Healy, Laurent Mathevet

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitylearningimplementationmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods -- the general case ⋮ Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities ⋮ A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation ⋮ The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods ⋮ Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms

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