Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00285zbMath1096.91039OpenAlexW3121173810MaRDI QIDQ4823476

Rui Albuquerque, Hugo A. Hopenhayn

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_493.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62)

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