COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
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Publication:4916137
DOI10.1142/S0219198912400026zbMath1261.91035OpenAlexW2087042360MaRDI QIDQ4916137
Hassan Benchekroun, Ngo Van Long
Publication date: 19 April 2013
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912400026
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
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