Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage
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Publication:5154751
DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.12755OpenAlexW3197398676WikidataQ130990430 ScholiaQ130990430MaRDI QIDQ5154751
Robert Bredereck, Rolf Niedermeier, Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger
Publication date: 5 October 2021
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.04948
Related Items (5)
Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences ⋮ Preference swaps for the stable matching problem ⋮ The complexity of matching games: a survey ⋮ Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems ⋮ Parameterized complexity of stable roommates with ties and incomplete lists through the lens of graph parameters
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