Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
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Publication:5288084
DOI10.2307/2526911zbMath0771.90014OpenAlexW1977157597MaRDI QIDQ5288084
Publication date: 30 September 1993
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526911
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Hierarchical systems (93A13) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (8)
GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT ⋮ The value of information for auctioneers ⋮ The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case ⋮ Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology ⋮ Contracts with endogenous information ⋮ Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered ⋮ Contracts and productive information gathering ⋮ Pessimistic information gathering
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