Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons

DOI10.1002/net.21458zbMath1269.91028OpenAlexW2109100022MaRDI QIDQ5326768

Tim Roughgarden, Yevgeniy Dodis, Richard John Cole

Publication date: 6 August 2013

Published in: Networks (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/net.21458

zbMATH Keywords

routingprice of anarchytraffic equilibriashortest path protocols

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)

Related Items (4)

Congestion games with mixed objectives ⋮ Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives ⋮ A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time ⋮ “Beat-Your-Rival” Routing Games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Atomic routing games on maximum congestion
• Efficient graph topologies in network routing games
• The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands.
• Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• How bad is selfish routing?
• Fast, Fair, and Efficient Flows in Networks
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
• Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
• Algorithms and Computation
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology

This page was built for publication: Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons