On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00278zbMath1137.91401OpenAlexW2053130478MaRDI QIDQ5477773

Philippe Jehiel, Olivier Compte

Publication date: 29 June 2006

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00278

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning ⋮ On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders ⋮ Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions ⋮ The insider's curse ⋮ Comparative efficiency of altruism and egoism as voting strategies in stochastic environment ⋮ Information acquisition during a Dutch auction ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study ⋮ Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents ⋮ Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids ⋮ Equilibrium competition, social welfare and corruption in procurement auctions ⋮ Auction design with costly preference elicitation

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