Repeated Games with Frequent Signals*

DOI10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.233zbMath1182.91035OpenAlexW2152141825MaRDI QIDQ5850901

David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 20 January 2010

Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3160491

zbMATH Keywords

aggregationdiffusion processimperfect public signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (9)

Tail probabilities for triangular arrays ⋮ A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes ⋮ Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game ⋮ Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ Restricted feedback in long term relationships ⋮ On preemption in discrete and continuous time ⋮ On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time ⋮ Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact ⋮ Some notes and comments on the efficient use of information in repeated games with Poisson signals

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