scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7657254
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Publication:5879170
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Publication date: 25 February 2023
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Collections of articles of miscellaneous specific interest (00B15) Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-06) Social choice (91B14)
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