A Bayesian equilibrium for simultaneous first-price auctions for complementary goods and quasi-linear bids

DOI10.3934/jdg.2022007zbMath1519.91123OpenAlexW4226296893MaRDI QIDQ6107325

Karla Flores-Zarur, William Olvera-Lopez

Publication date: 3 July 2023

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2022007

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian Nash equilibriumstrategic behaviorsimultaneous auctionsfirst-price mechanismquasi-linear property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Handbook of game theory. Vol. 4
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies and common values
• Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra.
• TWO-OBJECT TWO-BIDDER SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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