1-convex extensions of incomplete cooperative games and the average value
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Publication:6123436
DOI10.1007/S11238-023-09946-8arXiv2107.04679OpenAlexW4383868501MaRDI QIDQ6123436
Publication date: 4 March 2024
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.04679
uncertaintycooperative gamesShapley valuenucleolussolution conceptsvalues1-convexitytau-valueincomplete cooperative games
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Cites Work
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