Communication between unbiased agents

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.008zbMath1530.91085OpenAlexW4387108207MaRDI QIDQ6188270

Francesc Dilmé

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.008

zbMATH Keywords

strategic communicationskewed preferencesunbiased agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Voronoi languages: equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals
• Pure communication between agents with close preferences.
• Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
• Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication
• Language Barriers
• Language and the Theory of the Firm
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Optimal Delegation
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria

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