Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games

DOI10.4204/eptcs.379.5arXiv2307.07562OpenAlexW4383618659MaRDI QIDQ6199594

Sunil Simon, Krzysztof R. Apt

Publication date: 28 February 2024

Published in: Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.07562

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

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• Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games

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