A value for multichoice games

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00054-2MaRDI QIDQ5934227zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Emilio Calvo, Juan Carlos Santos

Publication date 1 February 2002

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00054-2

zbMATH Keywords

Aumann-Shapley valuebalanced contributionscost allocationmultichoice gamesShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions
• A sufficient condition on f for (f after mu) to be in pNAD
• A value for continuously-many-choice cooperative games
• Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure
• An Application of the Aumann-Shapley Prices for Cost Allocation in Transportation Problems
• Characterizations of a multi-choice value
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Conservation of energy in value theory
• Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
• Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4164504 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226097 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing
• Internal Telephone Billing Rates—A Novel Application of Non-Atomic Game Theory
• Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games
• Multilinear Extensions of Games
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Potentials and Weighted Values of Nonatomic Games
• Potentials in cooperative TU-games
• Serial Cost Sharing
• Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
• Values of Non-Atomic Games

Cited in

(28)

• Convex multi-choice games: characterizations and monotonic allocation schemes
• A value for mixed action-set games
• The multichoice consistent value
• Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
• The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games
• A value for continuously-many-choice cooperative games
• Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
• The multichoice coalition value
• The duplicate extension for the equal allocation of nonseparable costs
• A new approach to the core and Weber set of multichoice games
• On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
• Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure
• Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
• Converse consistent enlargements of the unit-level-core of the multi-choice games
• Limit property of a multi-choice value and the fuzzy value
• Capital allocation for portfolios with non-linear risk aggregation
• MOULIN REDUCTION, V-N REDUCTION AND AXIOMATIZATIONS OF THE DUPLICATE CORE
• Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games
• The pseudo-average rule: bankruptcy, cost allocation and bargaining
• Four axiomatic characterizations of the integrated gradients attribution method
• Prices in mixed cost allocation problems
• The egalitarian solution for multichoice games
• Multi-choice clan games and their core
• Cost allocation schemes: An asymptotic approach
• The generalized symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value for multichoice games with a coalition structure
• The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games
• The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
• The serial property and restricted balanced contributions in discrete cost sharing problems

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