Approval voting and scoring rules with common values
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 765034 (Why is no real title available?)
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
Cited in
(13)- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
- Information aggregation with runoff voting
- A Condorcet jury theorem for large \textit{Poisson} elections with multiple alternatives
- Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
- (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting
- Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory
- Bargaining through approval
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- When does approval voting make the ``right choices?
- VMAVA+: (VOTING METHOD BASED ON APPROVAL VOTING AND ARITHMETIC MEAN)+
- Full information equivalence in large elections
- Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections
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