Approval voting in subset elections
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This paper deals with the addition of voter's individual preferences stated in terms of approval voting. When we change the set of candidates evaluated, if each individual adopts an utility maximizing strategy, the individual approval function will not change stated preferences. It is shown here how, when we add voter's preferences, this property may be violated, in the sense that, even if all individuals have the same approval function in a given subset of candidates, the overall election outcome in any other subset may contradict it.
Recommendations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738
- Approval voting
- Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences
- Approval Voting in Large Electorates
- Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
- Approval elections with a variable number of winners
- Approval balloting for multi-winner elections
- A simple characterization of approval voting
- Characterizing approval voting
- Multi-winner voting with approval preferences
Cited in
(10)- Characterizing approval voting
- On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data
- Piercing numbers in approval voting
- Approval Voting in Large Electorates
- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
- Approval elections with a variable number of winners
- Handbook on approval voting
- Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
- Approval voting: three examples
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