Bargaining: Separately or together?

DOI10.1007/S10058-007-0037-0MaRDI QIDQ926329zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alp E. Atakan

Publication date 27 May 2008

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0037-0

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingcoalition formationunionshold-up

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Decentralized versus collective bargaining -- an experimental study
• Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation
• Labor Union Objectives and Collective Bargaining
• Bargaining on behalf of a constituency
• Union-firm bargaining agenda revisited: when unions have distinct preferences

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining
• Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: The case of the nucleolus
• Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Monopoly, syndicate, and Shapley value: About some conjectures
• Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies

Cited in

(8)

• Union-firm bargaining agenda revisited: when unions have distinct preferences
• One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable
• Do negotiated agreements lead to cost efficiency?
• Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games
• Decentralized versus collective bargaining -- an experimental study
• Should the more efficient firm expand? A bargaining perspective
• Buyer groups as strategic commitments
• Individual versus collective bargaining under relative income concerns

This page was built for publication: Bargaining: Separately or together?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q926329)