Characterization of Nash equilibria of large games
This paper deals with an extension of large games (continuum of players and each player has a zero measure) by assigning each player a bio-social trait. These games are called LGT. The Nash equilibrium with the trait function of an LGT induces a joint distribution on the product of state and trait spaces. This is called the action-trait distribution in equilibrium. The authors provide a characterisation of the action-trait distribution in equilibrium under two sets of conditions: 1) countability of the set of actions and traits or 2) nowhere equivalence assumption. Then, existence of the characterisation result is provided and the necessity of the two sets of conditions to the characterisation result.
- Discrete choice with social interactions
- Existence of Nash equilibria in large games
- Fixed-point and Minimax Theorems in Locally Convex Topological Linear Spaces
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3274494 (Why is no real title available?)
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