Conditional Monitoring Policy Under Moral Hazard

DOI10.1287/MNSC.38.8.1106MaRDI QIDQ4017545zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Son Ku Kim, Yoon S. Suh

Publication date 16 January 1993

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.8.1106

zbMATH Keywords

accountingconditional monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

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• Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover
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