Condorcet consistency and pairwise justifiability under variable agendas
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Cites work
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- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Transitive Binary Social Choices and Intraprofile Conditions
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow's and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems
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