Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences

DOI10.1007/S001820400179MaRDI QIDQ2572440zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters, T. Storcken

Publication date 9 November 2005

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp323.pdf, http://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/81a8ae89-97f3-4e0b-b927-2b9c683ccdec

zbMATH Keywords

constitutional implementationeffectivity functiongame formSocial choice correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(6)

• Constitutional implementation.
• Core implementation via dynamic game forms
• Ideology and endogenous constitutions
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
• Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium

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