Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2017.1691MaRDI QIDQ4971365zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yash Kanoria, Daniela Saban, Jay Sethuraman

Publication date 12 October 2020

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1691

zbMATH Keywords

convergencematchingcoretransferable utilitystochastic modelwagesuniqueness of equilibriumassignment markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• The size of the core in assignment markets
• A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market
• Assignment markets with the same core
• The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market
• Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies
• An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
• Analysis of the core of multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978446
• Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054809

Cites work

• Coalitional bargaining in networks
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Competitive equilibria in two-sided matching markets with general utility functions
• Estimating matching games with transfers
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Large matching markets as two-sided demand systems
• Marriage, honesty, and stability
• Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem
• On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem
• Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
• Probability. Theory and examples.
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The nonatomic assignment model
• The size of the core in assignment markets

Cited in

(8)

• Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets
• The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets
• Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core
• The size of the core in assignment markets
• A survey on assignment markets
• Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
• Unique ergodicity in feedback interconnections of ensembles of agents
• A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market

This page was built for publication: Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4971365)