Efficient trading with restriction

DOI10.1007/S10058-009-0077-8MaRDI QIDQ843741zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hu Lu, Yuntong Wang

Publication date 15 January 2010

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0077-8

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designefficient trading

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• Efficient trading with nonlinear utility
• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders
• Matching with restricted trade

Cites work

• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders

Cited in

(4)

• Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements
• Reorganizing a partnership efficiently
• Limits of semistatic trading strategies
• Efficient trading with nonlinear utility

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