Evolutionary implementation with partially effective institutions

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.12.004MaRDI QIDQ7006702zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ratul Lahkar

Publication date 27 March 2025

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsexternalitiesinstitutionspotential gamesTullock contest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Potential and congestion games (91A14) Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)

Cites work

• Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case
• Comparative statics for aggregative games. The strong concavity case
• Elimination of non-individualistic preferences in large population aggregative games
• Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces
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• Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5869530 (Why is no real title available?)
• Imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space
• Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development
• Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation
• Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case
• On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models.
• Pairwise comparison dynamics for games with continuous strategy space
• Potential games
• Potential games with continuous player sets
• Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action sets
• The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets
• Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical

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