On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models.
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This paper proposes a new solution concept in game theory, evolutionary robustness. A population is evolutionarily robust if it obtains a higher than average payoff against all possible payoffs which are close in the weak topology. Evolutionary robustness implies uninvadability, and the concepts of a continuous stable strategy (CSS) and a neighborhood invader strategy (NIS). These concepts do not guarantee dynamical stability (Lyapunov stability) for continuous strategy spaces, but evolutionary robustness is shown here to do so for replicator dynamics in symmetric 2-person games.
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Cited in
(76)- Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case
- Evolution in games with a continuous action space
- Evolutionary and dynamic stability in continuous population games
- CSS, NIS and dynamic stability for two-species behavioral models with continuous trait spaces
- Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case
- Political institutions and the evolution of character traits
- Stability of the replicator dynamics for games in metric spaces
- On the probabilistic transmission of continuous cultural traits
- A stochastic model of evolutionary dynamics with deterministic large-population asymptotics
- Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
- Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability?
- Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games
- An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games
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- Evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
- The replicator dynamics for multilevel selection in evolutionary games
- The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets
- Incomplete information, dynamic stability and the evolution of preferences: two examples
- Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game
- Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces
- Evolutionary stability of prospect theory preferences
- Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information
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- Measure dynamics on a one-dimensional continuous trait space: theoretical foundations for adaptive dynamics
- Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space
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- Law of the minimum paradoxes
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- Robustness against indirect invasions in asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces
- Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences
- Robustness against indirect invasions
- Perturbed Bayesian best response dynamic in continuum games
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- Evolutionary implementation with partially effective institutions
- Co-evolution of viruses and games
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- A graphic measure for game-theoretic robustness
- Conspicuous consumption dynamics
- On the observational equivalence of random matching
- On a class of operator equations arising in infinite dimensional replicator dynamics
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