Expected utility as an expression of linear preference intensity

DOI10.1007/S11238-025-10024-4MaRDI QIDQ6970762zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Andres Perea

Publication date 17 June 2025

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S11238-025-10024-4

zbMATH Keywords

conditional preference relationdecision problemsexpected utilitygamespreference intensityweak dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08) Utility theory (91B16)

Cites work

• A Definition of Subjective Probability
• A derivation of expected utilty maximization in the context of a game
• Axioms for expected utility in n-person games
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality
• Case-Based Decision Theory
• Efficient compromising
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 41812 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mixed extensions of decision problems under uncertainty
• Mixture axioms in linear and multilinear utility theories
• Non-cooperative games
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Sequential Equilibria
• Theory of games and economic behavior.

This page was built for publication: Expected utility as an expression of linear preference intensity

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6970762)