Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00122-2MaRDI QIDQ1429920zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Federico Echenique

Publication date 27 May 2004

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-155427372

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic gamesequilibriumStrategic complementaritiesSubgame-perfectSupermodular gamesTarski's fixed point theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Recommendations

• Strategic complements in two stage, \(2\times 2\) games
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Undominated equilibria in games with strategic complementarities
• Games with strategic complements and substitutes
• Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games

Cites work

• A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games
• A course in game theory.
• A lattice-theoretic approach to a class of dynamic games
• Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle
• Continuous stochastic games of capital accumulation with convex transitions
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Game theory
• Markov equilibria of stochastic games with complementarities
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• On problems with information in some games: Modelling the strategies in some dynamic games
• On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Sensitivity analysis of multisector optimal economic dynamics
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization
• The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice

Cited in

(16)

• Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games
• Commitment games
• Lexicographic domination in extensive games
• Almost strict competitiveness in extensive games
• A characterization of strategic complementarities.
• The limit of targeting in networks
• On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities
• Strategic complements in two stage, \(2\times 2\) games
• Index-wise comparative statics
• Tractable dynamic global games and applications
• A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities
• The theory of extensive form games
• Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk
• Strategic complementarity in games
• Strategic complementarities and nested potential games
• Identifying reaction functions in differential oligopoly games

This page was built for publication: Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities.

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1429920)