Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem
From MaRDI portal
Asymptotic approximations, asymptotic expansions (steepest descent, etc.) (41A60) Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Applications of branching processes (60J85) Numerical integration (65D30) Applications of game theory (91A80) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)
Abstract: We study fixation in large, but finite, populations with two types, and dynamics governed by birth-death processes. By considering a restricted class of such processes, we derive a continuous approximation for the probability of fixation that is valid beyond the weak-selection (WS) limit. From the continuous approximations, we then obtain asymptotic approximations for evolutionary dynamics with at most one equilibrium, in the selection-driven regime, that does not preclude a weak-selection regime. As an application, we study the fixation pattern when the infinite population limit has an interior Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS): (i) we show that the fixation pattern for the Hawk and Dove game satisfies what we term the one-half law: if the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is outside a small interval around , the fixation is of dominance type; (ii) we also show that, outside of the weak-selection regime, the long-term dynamics of large populations can have very little resemblance to the infinite population case; in addition, we also present results for the case of two equilibria. Finally, we present continuous restatements valid for large populations of two classical concepts naturally defined in the discrete case: (i) the definition of an strategy; (ii) the definition of a risk-dominant strategy. We then present two applications of these restatements: (i) we obtain an asymptotic definition valid in the quasi-neutral regime that recovers both the one-third law under linear fitness and the generalised one-third law for -player games; (ii) we extend the ideas behind the (generalised) one-third law outside the quasi-neutral regime and, as a generalisation, we introduce the concept of critical-frequency; (iii) we recover the classification of risk-dominant strategies for -player games.
Recommendations
- Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations
- The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law
- Fixation of strategies for an evolutionary game in finite populations
- Fixation probabilities for the Moran process in evolutionary games with two strategies: graph shapes and large population asymptotics
- Extreme selection unifies evolutionary game dynamics in finite and infinite populations
Cites work
- A microscopic probabilistic description of a locally regulated population and macroscopic approximations
- Comparison and content of the Wright-Fisher model of random genetic drift, the diffusion approximation, and an intermediate model
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary dynamics. Exploring the equations of life.
- Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Evolutionary multiplayer games
- Evolutionary stability for large populations
- Fixation of strategies for an evolutionary game in finite populations
- From discrete to continuous evolution models: a unifying approach to drift-diffusion and replicator dynamics
- From Individual Stochastic Processes to Macroscopic Models in Adaptive Evolution
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3951715 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45971 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49093 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53146 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3493681 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3806623 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1821102 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1409619 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3194920 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3069600 (Why is no real title available?)
- Large fluctuations and fixation in evolutionary games
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
- Mathematical population genetics. I: Theoretical introduction.
- On the local controllability of a class of multidimensional quasilinear parabolic equations
- On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
- Persistence of Dynamical Systems under Random Perturbations
- Quasi-stationary distributions and population processes
- Singular solutions of the diffusion equation of population genetics
- The different limits of weak selection and the evolutionary dynamics of finite populations
- The frequency-dependent Wright-Fisher model: diffusive and non-diffusive approximations
- The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
- The transient properties of balancing selection in large finite populations
- Unifying evolutionary dynamics: from individual stochastic processes to macroscopic models
Cited in
(25)- Fixation probabilities when the population size undergoes cyclic fluctuations.
- Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations
- On the stochastic evolution of finite populations
- Fitness potentials and qualitative properties of the Wright-Fisher dynamics
- Fixation probabilities for the Moran process in evolutionary games with two strategies: graph shapes and large population asymptotics
- Invasion probabilities, hitting times, and some fluctuation theory for the stochastic logistic process
- Emergence of random selections in evolution of biological populations
- Gradient flow formulations of discrete and continuous evolutionary models: a unifying perspective
- On inferring evolutionary stability in finite populations using infinite population models
- From fixation probabilities to \(d\)-player games: an inverse problem in evolutionary dynamics
- Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
- How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?
- The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
- Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?
- Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
- Large fluctuations and fixation in evolutionary games
- Persistence extends reciprocity
- Asymptotic behavior of mean fixation times in the Moran process with frequency-independent fitnesses
- Population dynamics and games of variable size
- Bernstein polynomial approximation of fixation probability in finite population evolutionary games
- Continuous approximations for the fixation probability of the Moran processes on star graphs
- On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
- The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law
- Insuperable strategies in two-player and reducible multi-player games
- Fixation probabilities for the Moran process with three or more strategies: general and coupling results
This page was built for publication: Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q907125)
