Freedom and voting power
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Cites work
- A Representation Theorem for "Preference for Flexibility"
- Approval voting
- Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
- Freedom of choice and rational decisions
- Freedom of choice. A comparison of different rankings of opportunity sets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4145701 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
- Neutral freedom and freedom as control
- On diversity and freedom of choice
- On preference and freedom
- On ranking opportunity sets in economic environments
- Partition function form games. Coalitional games with externalities
- Power indices for multicandidate voting games
- Preference for Flexibility in a Savage Framework
- Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Ternary voting games
- The Banzhaf Index for Multicandidate Presidential Elections
- The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
- Welfare, preference and freedom
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