History as a coordination device
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Recommendations
- Equilibrium selection in coordination games with simultaneous play.
- Evolution and long run equilibria in coordination games with summary statistic payoff technologies
- Coordination cycles
- Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World
- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
Cites work
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- An approach to equilibrium selection
- An iterative method of solving a game
- Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
- Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World
- Fictitious play by cases
- Fictitious play property for games with identical interests
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Probabilities as Similarity-Weighted Frequencies
- Rationality of belief or: why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- The Evolution of Conventions
- The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
Cited in
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