How to sell information optimally: an algorithmic study

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.ITCS.2021.81MaRDI QIDQ7229370zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yang Cai

Publication date 15 April 2026

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.ITCS.2021.81

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic game theoryinformation designmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites work

• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
• Algorithmic Bayesian persuasion
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7788419 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mixture selection, mechanism design, and signaling
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• On Linear Characterizations of Combinatorial Optimization Problems
• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• On the hardness of signaling
• Optimal Auction Design
• Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations
• Selling Information Through Consulting
• Selling two goods optimally
• Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
• Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
• The ellipsoid method and its consequences in combinatorial optimization

Cited in

(1)

• An algorithmic framework for black-box reductions from Bayesian mechanism design to algorithm design

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