Improving the Chilean college admissions system
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Recommendations
Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with stable score-limits
- Demand analysis using strategic reports: an application to a school choice mechanism
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
- Median stable matching for markets with wages
- On cores and indivisibility
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
- Strategy-proofness in the large
- Student admissions and faculty recruitment
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its applications
Cited in
(7)- Gradual college admission
- University rankings from the revealed preferences of the applicants
- College admissions with affirmative action
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Dorm augmented college assignments
- Match stability with a costly and flexible number of positions
- Equal treatment and its market design implications
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