Information in conflicts.
Most of economic theory focuses on the analysis of voluntary market transactions with well- defined property rights. But many real-world market transactions involve an outright conflict. Here the effect of asymmetric information in such conflicts is investigated. A conflict itself is modeled as a two-player contest. It is supposed that in the contest the participants make efforts or expenditures in order to increase their probability of winnig a prize or object. A case of two agents competing for a price that would be of the same value to both if both knew the value with certainty, but it is assumed this value is uncertain. It is noted that from the point of view of auction theory the most interesting result in the paper is the mildly paradoxical observation that the uniformed player in an asymmetric information contest wins the object with stricly higher probability than the informed player, something that cannot happen in a first-price auction.
- Non-deterministic group contest with private information
- An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information
- Information sharing in private value lottery contest
- A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests
- The evolution of preferences for conflict
- Private versus complete information in auctions
- Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information
- A tug-of-war team contest
- On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests
- Information sharing in a contest game with group identity
- Rent-seeking group contests with one-sided private information
- Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types
- Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests
- Information in Tullock contests
- The role of information in contests
- Common-value contests with asymmetric information
- Population uncertainty in contests
- A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests
- Social welfare in search games with asymmetric information
- Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
- Who gains from information asymmetry?
- Information acquisition in conflicts
- Probabilistic procurement auctions
- Accuracy in contests: players' perspective
- Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists
- Cognitive empathy in conflict situations
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
- The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests
- Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
- On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result
- Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
- Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
- Participation in deterministic contests
- Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests
- Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information
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