Intertemporal versus spatial externalities in counterterror policy games

DOI10.1007/S13235-016-0188-0MaRDI QIDQ1707452zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors João Ricardo Faria, Emilson C. D. Silva, Daniel G. Arce

Publication date 3 April 2018

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-016-0188-0

zbMATH Keywords

counterterrorismspatial spilloverscoordination failureshistory-dependent preferencesintertemporal spillovers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Dynamic games (91A25)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1397170 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Habit Forming Optimal Growth Model
• A differential game related to terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg strategies
• Foundations of intrinsic habit formation
• Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules
• Incentive Stackelberg Strategies for a Dynamic Game on Terrorism
• Optimal Growth with Intertemporally Dependent Preferences
• Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth
• Rational demand and expenditures patterns under habit formation
• Terror Cycles
• Terror and counterterror operations: Differential game with cyclical Nash solution
• Terrorists' eradication versus perpetual terror war
• Weakest-link attacker-defender games with multiple attack technologies

Cited in

(4)

• The UN in the lab
• A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism
• The path of terror attacks
• The refugee game: the relationship between individual security expenditures and collective security

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