Majority decisions when abstention is possible

DOI10.1016/J.DISC.2011.12.024MaRDI QIDQ764902zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nicholas Matteo, S. Shelah, Paul Larson

Publication date 16 March 2012

Published in Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1003.2756

zbMATH Keywords

choice functionCondorcet's paradoxmajority decisiontournament

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Abstract: Suppose we are given a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set. The set is considered as a set of alternatives (say candidates for an office) and the functions as potential "voters". The question is, what choice functions agree, on every pair, with the majority of some finite subfamily of the voters? For the problem as stated, a complete characterization was given in citet{shelah2009mdp}, but here we allow each voter to abstain. There are four cases.

Review text

Consider a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set of, say, candidates for an office. Call each of such functions a voter. The question addressed in this paper is: what choice functions agree, on every pair, with the majority of some finite subfamily of the voters? This question is here addressed for the general case of voters being allowed to abstain. Aside from the trivial case, the possible families of (partial) choice functions break into three cases in terms of the functions that can be generated by majority decision. In one of these, cycles along the lines of Condorcet's paradox are avoided. In another, all partial choice functions can be represented.

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3221981 (Why is no real title available?)
• On -majority voting paradoxes
• The Voting Problem
• Voting paradoxes and digraphs realizations
• What majority decisions are possible

Cited in

(7)

• What majority decisions are possible
• Arrovian aggregation models
• Majority vote following a debate
• On exiting after voting
• Majority voting on orders
• Some characterizations of resolute majority rules
• Avoiding Anscombe's paradox

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