Market-based incentives

DOI10.1111/IERE.12220MaRDI QIDQ5350497zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Borys Grochulski, Yuzhe Zhang

Publication date 1 September 2017

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12220

zbMATH Keywords

labor marketmarket-based incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Career concerns and performance reporting in optimal incentive contracts
• Executive compensation: a calibration approach
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
• Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts

Cited in

(10)

• Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination
• Optimal long-term contracts with disability insurance under limited commitment
• Optimal CEO turnover
• Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
• Quota bonuses with heterogeneous agents
• Robust contracts with one-sided commitment
• The benefits of aggregate performance metrics in the presence of career concerns
• Market competition and lower tier incentives
• On the efficiency of markets for managers
• Signaling drive over the long term

This page was built for publication: Market-based incentives

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5350497)