Natural interviewing equilibria in matching settings
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Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Constrained school choice
- Controlled school choice with soft bounds and overlapping types
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive compatibility of large centralized matching markets
- Interview hoarding
- Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate
- Marriage, honesty, and stability
- NON-NULL RANKING MODELS. I
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- Simultaneous Search
- Stability of marriage with externalities
- Stable marriage with ties and bounded length preference lists
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- Student portfolios and the college admissions problem
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
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