Natural interviewing equilibria in matching settings

DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01541-2MaRDI QIDQ6960131zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Allan Borodin, Joanna Drummond, K. Larson, Omer Lev

Publication date 14 July 2025

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-024-01541-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Constrained school choice
• Controlled school choice with soft bounds and overlapping types
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive compatibility of large centralized matching markets
• Interview hoarding
• Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate
• Marriage, honesty, and stability
• NON-NULL RANKING MODELS. I
• Optimal truncation in matching markets
• Simultaneous Search
• Stability of marriage with externalities
• Stable marriage with ties and bounded length preference lists
• Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
• Student portfolios and the college admissions problem
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• The stable marriage problem with master preference lists

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