New Approximations for Coalitional Manipulation in Scoring Rules

DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.11335MaRDI QIDQ4621488zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Orgad Keller, Avinatan Hassidim, Noam Hazon

Publication date 12 February 2019

Published in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11335

zbMATH Keywords

Borda protocolcoalitional manipulationscoring rulesocial choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Social choice (91B14)

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(7)

• A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
• Weighted manipulation for four-candidate Llull is easy
• Isomorphic Distances Among Elections
• Approximating weighted and priced bribery in scoring rules
• Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems
• Drawing a map of elections
• Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem

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